Geostrategic Claratin

It's what we need to win in Afghanistan, and we don't have it.

Remember right after 9/11, when we knew damn good and well that Pakistan's ISI was the Taliban's patron and therefore an accessory to al Qaeda's attacks, and were so undeterred that Richard Armitrage (yes, the Wilsons' leaker, in case Sean Penn - good casting, I gotta admit - starts leading your recollection of "Yellowcake Joe" and his non-spook moll astray again) told Pervez Musharraf that we'd "bomb his country back to the stone age" if he didn't switch sides RIGHT F'ing NOW?  And Musharraf complied with such alacrity that the only reason nobody noticed was that Pakistani army uniforms come with brown pants?

Now THAT was clarity.  And that clarity remained, more or less, for the next six years, or as long as Musharraf remained in power, because only Musharraf had the clout to control the Pakistani army and at least keep the ISI on a moderately tight leash.  Ergo, realpolitik demanded that President Bush put aside his Wilsonian democracy fetish until the Taliban on both sides of the Af-Pak frontier could be crushed once and for all.  Deposing Musharraf prematurely would inevitably lead to Pakistan's re-destablization, free the Islamist ISI to openly support the Taliban, and therefore oppose us in Afghanistan, muddlize the whole theatre, and create such a hopeless mess that victory would become well nigh impossible.

And that's exactly what happened.  So when King Hussein whines about having inherited this particular problem, it's his metaphorical stopped clock.

Musharraf was the lynchpin holding everything else together.  Once he was gone, it all pretty much went to hell, to where it became little wonder that Hamid Karzai began to doubt NATO's ability to hold down the Taliban (particularly when it would pretty much require invading Pakistan to cut off ISI's support), hedge his bets, and suddenly see "peace partners" in the faces of his enemies.

The hell of it is, we know how this road ends, and so does he:

The same is likely to happen in Afghanistan if those Taliban leaders who have committed the worst atrocities are given control over the communities they terrorized. Images of abuses against women are likely to be broadcast around the world, raising the painful question of whether this is what foreign and Afghan troops sacrificed for. There could be retribution against perceived U.S. and government collaborators, and people fleeing areas where insurgents are given power. Afghanistan’s ethnic minorities (who together constitute a majority) are especially fearful of a deal that increases the Taliban’s influence; many Afghans believe that a hasty process could lead to a broader civil war.

The short of it is, Afghanistan, after nine years of war, will be returned to the pre-9/11 status quo ante: Taliban-controlled, a safe haven for al Qaeda, allied with Pakistani Intelligence, only this time without the check that used to be provided by the Pakistani Army.  All that time, blood, and treasure sacrificed so that bin Laden could wind up CLOSER to controlling Pakistan's nuclear arsenal.

How does it make y'all feel that your very lives might be riding on the outcome of pathetic hijinx like this?:

“We picked up Baradar and the others because they were trying to make a deal without us,” said a Pakistani security official, who, like numerous people interviewed about the operation, spoke anonymously because of the delicacy of relations between Pakistan, Afghanistan and the United States. “We protect the Taliban. They are dependent on us. We are not going to allow them to make a deal with Karzai and the Indians.”…

A senior NATO officer in Kabul said that in arresting Mr. Baradar and the other Taliban leaders, the Pakistanis may have been trying to buy time to see if President Obama’s strategy begins to prevail. If it does, the Pakistanis may eventually decide to let the Taliban make a deal. But if the Americans fail — and if they begin to pull out — then the Pakistanis may decide to retain the Taliban as their allies…

The Pakistanis refused to allow the C.I.A. to interrogate Mr. Baradar or even to be present when they spoke. Another Pakistani official said Mr. Baradar was taken to a safe house in Islamabad, where he was debriefed. It was only several days later that the C.I.A. learned of his identity and were allowed to question him.

The Pakistani official even joked about the C.I.A.’s naïveté. “They are so innocent,” he said.

Eeyore asks, rhetorically (or at least he SHOULD):

Why that isn’t instant grounds for recalling the U.S. ambassador from Pakistan, I have no idea; if they’re releasing men into the field who are angling to kill American troops and destabilize the Afghan government, they’re basically operating parallel to how Iran is operating with some of the Shiite militias in Iraq. And yet, no consequences.

That answers both questions, actually.  The Bush Administration, quite simply, did not want war with Iran, even though Iran waged war against us in Iraq for years and a showdown with the mullahs is inevitable.  The same, of course, holds infinitely moreso for the Obama regime in both theaters.  And even if they did seek victory, the price they'd have to pay - a wider war, especially if we brought in our Indian allies to counterbalance the Paks, as Eeyore suggests - would be a dead-on-arrival non-starter.

And so we cut weak-assed deals with the enemy that will guarantee precisely the wider war we want to avoid, at far greater ultimate cost to ourselves.  A two-front war, as a matter of fact.  A war that we have refused to fight and refused to fight, until the time approaches when we will no longer be able to fight it, much less win.

In the back of my mind, knowing that America doesn't do long wars, I've always harbored this doubt.  Because the cost of what it would take to refocus public determination might be more than we can imagine.

That's one instinct whose clarity I wish I could keep ignoring.  Because more than ever it seems like only a matter of time.

And time is running out.